

I.

This paper occasions a welcome return to *The Origin of the Work of Art*¹ in light of my ongoing work on Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. If the concurrence of Heidegger's first lecture course on Nietzsche,² *The Will to Power as Art* (1936)³ and *The Origin of the Work of Art* (1937)⁴ is enough to suggest Nietzsche is on Heidegger's mind⁵ when he poses the question of art in terms of the eventual happening of truth, then—Hölderlin notwithstanding⁶—Heidegger's Nietzsche “confrontation”⁷ should shed some light on the axial mysteries of *Origin*. To advance this broader project, I first explore the relation between art and truth in two of the four lecture

¹ Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art* (24/161). References to *The Origin of the Work of Art* are first to the German, *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, in GA 5: *Holzwege* (Frankfurt Am Main: Klostermann, 1957) and then to the English translation as it appears in the edited volume *Basic Writings*, translated by Albert Hofstadter (London: Harper Perennial, 2008). References to the Addendum to *Origin* are from *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1960). Abbreviations of the German and English are rendered respectively as UK and *Origin*.

² Four lecture courses were dedicated to Nietzsche's thought between 1936 and 1940, two of which were delivered effectively in tandem with Heidegger's drafting and executing of *Origin*. The first of these addresses Nietzsche's conception of art, constituting the point of departure for the treatment as a whole, but also envisioning, via treatment of Nietzsche, an ontologically based aesthetics. At least one *Übung* (1938) was recently translated on the second of Nietzsche's *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen* (or *Untimely Meditations*), which I have elsewhere argued is a critical textual resource for Heidegger's thinking of the function of horizon in the operation of ekstatic temporality. Finally, several essays were composed as summary efforts that most capture Heidegger's eminently critical reading of Nietzsche in the early 1940s.

³ *Die Wille Zur Macht als Kunst* (1936). Henceforth *WMK*. All citations of Heidegger's lecture courses and essays on Nietzsche are to: *Nietzsche*, Erster Band (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1961) [NI], translated by David Farrell Krell, as *Nietzsche. Volume I: The Will to Power as Art, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979-84); *Volume III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982-87); and *Nietzsche*, Zweiter Band (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1961) [NII], translated by David Farrell Krell as *Nietzsche. Volume IV: Nihilism* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982-7).

⁴ I refer here to the “complete” text of UK, as derived from the 1936 delivery at Frankfurt (GA 5) and amended by Heidegger for the Reclam Edition of 1960. While I acknowledge the two preceding versions, I focus on the final lecture as delivered in Frankfurt to underscore the rough concurrence of Heidegger's refined presentation with the delivery of both *WMK* (WS 1936-37) and *Nietzsches Metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen* (SS 1937, hereafter *EWG*).

⁵ Though the question concerning the spirit of Nietzsche in the *Beiträge* has previously been raised by Gadamer, Pöggeler, and Vallega-Neu, among others, as regards UK, it remains relatively unexplored. For one compelling exception, cf. Tracy Colony, “Time and the Work of Art: Reconsidering Heidegger's *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche,” *Heidegger Studies* 19, (2003): 81-94.

⁶ I thank Will McNeill for his provocative question regarding Hölderlin, the favored poet of both Nietzsche and Heidegger, at the initial presentation of this paper (University of Chicago, April 2016). Indeed, if discussions of the strife between earth and world sound Nietzschean to the ear, there is no doubt a deeper reference to Hölderlin at play. However, for the purposes of this paper, it is necessary to bracket this possibility and to focus exclusively on the Nietzsche confrontation for two key reasons: 1) because the concurrence of the confrontation and the several drafts of UK should be taken seriously; 2) because Heidegger's “interpretation” of Nietzsche presents, albeit negatively, the emerging outline of his vision for the future of his own thinking, so any mindful effort to understand Heidegger's thinking in this period should give due consideration to the Nietzsche confrontation; and 3) because the distinction between the poet (Hölderlin) and the thinker (Nietzsche) is a late development. Early *Black Notebooks* reveal Heidegger thinking the two in alignment rather than contradistinction.

⁷ Translating the German *Auseinandersetzung*, Heidegger's own term for the encounter with Nietzsche.

courses Heidegger offered on Nietzsche between 1936 and 1940, and then turn to the 1956 Addendum to *Origin* to bring the question of the human to bear on the congruence between Heidegger's diagnosis of Nietzsche and his own efforts to speak to the function of art.

In beginning, a problem immediately presents itself: Heidegger's Nietzsche confrontation is no simple matter about which one may say, once and for all, Heidegger thought or felt thus about Nietzsche, period. At best, it is ambivalent – a creature of divergent paths, the twists and turns of which only temporarily decide the priority of one alternative over the other.

For example, in the closing pages of GA 29/30,⁸ Heidegger names Nietzsche the last of the greats to bear witness to *enthousiasmos* (that rapture in which we are carried away to the possible as a profound experience of world),⁹ while in 1940, in the lecture course *European Nihilism*,¹⁰ Nietzsche's intensification of the legacy of modernity installs human dominion over the world by making the subject the sole arbiter of truth (and falsity). And should it appear Heidegger earlier held a high opinion of Nietzsche and later revoked it, consider his stipulation in the 1952 lecture course, *What is Called Thinking?*, that Nietzsche's thought makes demands to which "we" are not equal.¹¹ In short, ambivalence names the unresolved tension¹² between Nietzsche as inspirational thinker whose eternal recurrence breathed life into the ekstatic temporality of *Being and Time*, and Nietzsche as the consummate metaphysician who exemplifies the decision for the predominance

⁸ Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 29/30 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), translated as *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* by William McNeill & Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

⁹ Note here the qualification of Van Gogh's painting in *Origin*, section I., (Thing and Work) (24/161).

¹⁰ Der Europäische Nihilismus, in NII (31-256) [Krell (1982) in *Nietzsche*, Volume IV]. Cf. in particular §§22-23. Cf. also the summative essay, »Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen und Der Wille zur Macht« in NII [Krell (1987) in *Nietzsche*, Volume III].

¹¹ Was Heißt Denken? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954). Translated by J. Glenn Gray as *What is Called Thinking?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 73. Readers familiar with Heidegger will recognize this stipulation as a compliment of the highest order, but all the more so when considered alongside Heidegger's word of advice to those who wish to approach this thinker who is close 'in time' to us contemporaries and therefore—in the fully metaphysical sense—the farthest from us in the order of knowledge. He cautions, "It is advisable, therefore, that you postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being, and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years" (73).

¹² Interestingly, Heidegger gives his readers an implicit directive in his conception of *essential ambiguity*, which he deploys to explain the function of Nietzsche's concept of truth in *Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis* (WME 1939) but introduces as early as *WMK* (1936). In a word, essential ambiguity names the wedding of traditional and divergent paths in a tense unity, a wedding that amplifies the turbulence that ensues when truth becomes error and the true world a lie. When we think Heidegger's ambivalence through the optic of essential ambiguity, Nietzsche was the divergent thinker *par excellence*, the thinker who ventured to the very edge of what was possible for metaphysics, the thinker who thought metaphysics to its end. Thus, we can see that on the one hand, to be the last metaphysician is the highest compliment. But on the other, even with so grand a destiny as to think the end of metaphysics, Nietzsche is *essentially* bound to the very tradition from which he most stridently wished to depart, thereby necessitating his overcoming. Cf. also note twenty-three.

of beings over Being – as a result of which, Nietzsche’s role is to be the final figure with whom Heidegger must contend in the effort to overcome metaphysics.

II.

This contention occurs, primarily, on the grounds of truth, even as Nietzsche raises art to the status of higher value. In *The Will to Power as Knowledge* (1939), Heidegger claims Nietzsche’s conception of truth is *holding-to-be-true*, a long hand formulation for *belief*.¹³ A statement, for example, needn’t be true so long as *some* statement is believed to be—that is, *held* to be—true. The hold, the literal *Halt*, is a temporal qualification: bringing to a halt, stopping, setting to rest, petrifying, fixating, and so on. Thus, when Heidegger claims in *WME* §19 that truth as holding-to-be-true is “the perspectival and horizontal intention and anticipation of identity and selfsameness as the ground of permanence,” we are meant to understand that, on Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche temporally weds the truth operation to the very ground of what it means to be identical, self-same, or permanent (i.e., classically speaking, what it means to be *in Being*) [616/123].

To clarify, the German for “anticipation,” *Voraussehen*, gives the literal sense of seeing in advance. Thus, truth as holding-to-be-true, on Heidegger’s reading, sets its intention to see in advance. As a consequence, the Nietzschean truth function elaborates the legacy of modernity, and of Kant, in particular. For Nietzsche, too, schematizes chaos through the advance sending out of categorial forms that order and condition the possibility of experience. In other words, Nietzsche’s conception of truth as holding-to-be-true, radical though it may be, still operates temporally speaking within the parameters of the tradition: it stabilizes what is in flux—whether sensory data, drives, or human bodily functions—to a graspable presence that can be witnessed over time to be self-same, identical, i.e. *to be*.

One may object that Nietzsche deliberately demoted truth in the hierarchy of values, such that even if we granted *a priori* status to its operation, truth remains subordinate, albeit not unrelated, to art. Heidegger apparently concurs:

¹³ *Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis* (*WME*), abridging a rich discussion that takes place primarily in §§5 and 8, 512f./35-36 and 536f./55-56, respectively, and in which knowledge operates in tandem with truth to secure life through stabilization.

“Human life itself, belonging to chaos, truly pertains to chaos as an overwhelming becoming, in the manner of art. What truth cannot do, *art* accomplishes: the transfiguration of what is alive to higher possibilities, hence the actualization and activity of life in the midst of the truly actual—chaos” (*WME* 616/123).

In the earlier lecture course, *The Will to Power as Art* (1936), Heidegger argues that it is precisely because of the opposition between the functions of truth and art that between them – for Nietzsche contra Plato – a discordance rages and rapture [*Rausch*] attunes all aesthetics.¹⁴ Whereas the discordance between truth and art for Plato is felicitous, i.e. is contentedly covered over by the impetus the sensuous offers to ascend to the truth of Being (the supra-sensuous), Nietzsche’s inverse Platonism kills off the supra-sensuous God and art is required to transfigure reality while truth becomes the illusion/lie.

Here, in *The Will to Power as Knowledge*, however, Heidegger alters the agenda. Art does indeed maintain the function of transfiguring life and delivering it over to higher possibilities, so it keeps its elevated status. But it can do so only on the basis of a deeper and hidden value, that of harmony [*homoīōsis, Einstimmigkeit*] with the truly “actual,” chaos. As a consequence of this harmony with chaos, Nietzsche’s art is transformed into a species of knowledge thought in terms of its relation to truth, whose task is to schematize chaos in accordance with that foremost practical need: that (human) life flourishes across time, that it achieves permanence.

So, to pose the question in a Heideggerian way, how then do matters stand with Nietzsche once *homoīōsis* enters onto the scene? To make a long story short, harmony turns out to be the oldest truth-trick in the book, going back to the Greeks and culminating in Nietzsche. By 1939, the reliance of art on constancy and on harmony transforms the discordance that raged in 1936 into a quiet pitter-patter, and Nietzsche into a counterfeit Kantian with a taste for chaos. Yet even in spite of this transformation, Nietzsche remains, for Heidegger, a thinker of significant ambiguity.

After all, how can Nietzsche both secure a conception of truth as fixity and stability *and* insist on harmony with chaos, with all that becomes? This is the position Heidegger maintains. Is it contradictory? No, because it is exactly what Heidegger would—and does—call ambiguous. In fact, “Nietzsche transformed himself into an ambiguous figure [*zweideutigen Gestalt*], and, within

¹⁴ Cf. *WMK*, §19.

his world and that of the present time, he had to do this. What we must do is grasp the forward thrust and the uniqueness, what is decisive and ultimate, behind this ambiguity” (*WME* 474/4).¹⁵

III.

In the Addendum to *Origin*¹⁶ Heidegger pens several provocative retrospective reflections. Though I cannot speak to all of the possibilities opened by the view afforded from 1956, it is nevertheless productive to invoke two moments: first, a claim that Heidegger makes concerning what reflection on art may be, and second, the delineation of two important hints. I turn now toward the claim, and leave the hints open, to be explored at the conclusion of these remarks.

Writ large, the Addendum to *Origin* is concerned with a certain tension between the language of fixing, setting, and standing and that of *letting* happen, *letting* be. Heidegger therefore makes it his task to specify the intended meaning of any major terms deployed in *Origin* that appear to hearken to his later designation of the essence of modern technology. *Ge-stell*, the “en-framing as which the work occurs when it sets itself up and sets itself forth,” is one such term that Heidegger later finds troubling, and for good reason (52/189).

In the Addendum Heidegger claims that the meaning of *Ge-stell* in *Origin* is a “letting-come-forth-here-into the rift-design as bounding outline or *peras*” (97/209).¹⁷ For his part, Heidegger claims his use of *Ge-stell* is faithfully related to the Greek sense of *morphe* as *Gestalt*. Without fully deconstructing that hyphenated phrase (nearly as difficult in German as in English), Heidegger attempts to think what it means *to create*, even as a letting, *a work – to create*, even as a letting, *a being*. The manner of creation he endeavors to think here places emphasis on letting, on release rather than formation, but this is no mere passivity. The work (of art)/being “created” is so

¹⁵ It is important to draw attention to Heidegger’s use of this classical metaphysical *trompe l’oeil* to assess Nietzsche’s intentions such that if we accede to Heidegger’s interpretation, then we have no choice but to grant that Nietzsche is a (consummate) metaphysician. Notice as well that this oppositional, i.e., metaphysical quality of concealed reversibility [*Umkehrbarkeit*] (i.e., Nietzsche says something one way as an affront to the tradition, but what he *means* by it is still thoroughly wedded to the tradition and in fact only more emphatically guarantees the project of modernity’s inheriting of the tradition), will lead “us,” the students sitting in on the lecture, to arrive seamlessly at the next section [*WME* §20] in which we revisit the Platonic distinction between the true and apparent worlds. This is, in other words, one among many very cleverly deployed didactic devices.

¹⁶ The Addendum appears in the German in the Reclam Edition of *Origin* (1960) and is maintained in the English translation by Hofstadter in the edited volume *Basic Writings* (Krell 2008).

¹⁷ Translating, *Her-vor-ankommen-lassens in den Riß als Umriß (peras)*.

radiant it polarizes the meaning-nexus of the human being (world) and the total withdrawal of that nexus (earth) to such an extent that the rift, the profound difference that brings what it distinguishes into intimacy, itself appears. As should be evident, this is ambitious stuff.

Notably, the resonance of the German that is lost in English – the repetition we hear in *Ge-stell* (en-framing), *aufstellt* (setting up), and *herstellt* (setting forth) – unites the work so en-framed with the setting up of world and the setting forth of earth that are the “two essential features of the work-being of the work” (36/173). In light of this terminological repetition at the heart of Heidegger’s argument, then, the question becomes: is this uniting of world, earth, and work in the creative act of bringing forth the work, even in its (active) passivity still an act of all-too human violence?

Clearly, if Heidegger’s own retrospective reflections can be trusted, he fears they may be. In the Addendum, he goes to great pains to specify that the *stellen* so operative in *Origin* be understood in terms of the *originary* sense of the Greek constellation: *logos-poiēsis-thesis*. The *derivative* interpretation of the meaning of this constellation, by contrast, begins with the Greek failure to pose the founding question at the moment of the founding experience (of *alētheia*), i.e., with the inception of the metaphysical tradition. Metaphysics then transforms in its modern iteration into another form of *stellen* less faithful to the *originary* Greek, viz. *vor-stellen*, “representation,” which sets itself up by commandeering, by “taking control of the absolute,” devoting itself to “fixing and securing in place” in the manner of which we should be most wary (98/209). Heidegger summarizes:

“When we hear the words ‘fix in place’ [*fest-stellen* in one form or another] and ‘enframing’ [*Gestell*] in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, we must...put out of mind the modern meaning of placing or enframing, and yet at the same time, we must not fail to note that, and in what way, the Being that defines the modern period—Being as enframing—stems from the Western destiny of Being and has not been thought *up* by the philosophers but rather thought *to* thinkers” (98/209-10).

Earlier in my remarks, I noted – designating one direction in which Heidegger’s ambivalence as regards Nietzsche pulls him – that Nietzsche is deemed the consummate metaphysician whose realization, i.e. fulfillment, of the trajectory of metaphysics marks him as the last, at the end. It is Nietzsche who, on Heidegger’s more critical view, takes up the legacy afforded him historically

by modernity and brings it to its utmost expression in the will-to-willing that makes the human being the sole arbiter of truth and falsity.

In other words, it is Nietzsche who is “responsible,” even if only as the recipient of a historically destined thought *to* the thinker, for the installation of the modern technological interpretation of the meaning of Being based on a hidden fidelity to *homoiōsis* that makes his transfiguring “art” as elevated over fixating “truth” while *apparently* radical, simply a reversal of that founding (i.e. Greek) interpretive mistake.

Here, in the Addendum to *Origin*, Heidegger’s concern is that in some way his *own* thinking may be affiliated with this “modern” trajectory, so he is careful (and clever!) to explicitly distantiate himself from the “modern” interpretation of *Gestell* and its affiliates. The thought *to* which Heidegger was destined, evidently, is other than modern, and in one sense, even other than Greek. Therefore, my analysis of the Addendum to *Origin* is both a piece of a larger effort to investigate the way in which Heidegger allocates Nietzsche to a specific place at the end of metaphysics, and of the more sophisticated and nuanced puzzle of Heidegger’s former (albeit inconclusive) subscription to the very thinking that was eventually, through Nietzsche, to be overcome.¹⁸

Naturally Heidegger’s intimate affiliation with the thought of Nietzsche resists witness. He is less than explicit in owning his indebtedness to Nietzsche, for example, in terms of temporal horizons and human freedom for death in *Being and Time*. But when one is tenacious enough to, in Heidegger’s terms, “wrest” these affiliations from concealment, one can come to understand that Heidegger’s confrontation with Nietzsche is at the same time (yet not reducible to) a confrontation with what Heidegger diagnoses to be the limits of his own early thinking. So, to bring together several strands of speculation in one complex knot, when Heidegger in 1956 casts a retrospective glance at *Origin* and the dangers that may have prevailed there even only

¹⁸ Such matters become even more complex when we consider the reworking, editing, and overwriting of several of the original manuscripts of lectures for publication. For example, we now understand that the definitive edition of the Nietzsche lectures published in 1961 and translated into English was significantly reworked by Heidegger to two ends: 1) to cleanse it of any filiation to National Socialism that was in evidence in the originals, and 2) to position Heidegger’s thinking at a greater distance from Nietzsche than was originally maintained. For more on this, cf. the Appendix to Gregory Fried, *Heidegger’s Polemos: From Being to Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 257-262, and Colony, “The Death of God and the Life of Being: Heidegger’s Confrontation with Nietzsche,” in *Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays*, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 197-216.

temporarily, we must wonder whether Heidegger senses in *Origin* an affiliation with Nietzsche (as he reads, and perhaps to a certain extent *mis-reads* him) from which he must now distantiate himself.

It is of course impossible to decide this in the space afforded here. I can only say that having returned to *Origin* in light of my own work I am compelled to pursue these possibilities further. But it is perhaps helpful to remark that there are indeed several aspects of *Origin* that have a Nietzschean ring—or, to put it in the words of Otto Pöggeler who remarked of the *Beiträge* (roughly concurrent, yet again with *Origin* and with the Nietzsche-confrontation),¹⁹ that one could sense the “Sils-Maria breeze and... *Ecce Homo* mood”.

And yet, there is perhaps equally as much evidence to suggest the confrontation was already being prepared, if not yet underway, in *Origin*.²⁰ In much the same way as *The Will to Power as Art* (1936) already indicts Nietzsche on the charge of inverse Platonism while remaining simultaneously in awe of aesthetic rapture, of art in the grand style – *Origin* is, to my eye, equally fraught.²¹ Caught between the polarization of heights and depths – whose only “repose” is in so intense an agitation that it appears to be equilibrated in the work fashioned by human hands – and a prescription to advance beyond the modern conception of the human being as the one who (violently) decides the Being of beings, *Origin* operates according to the same ambivalent logic. Hence the many allusions to the human being as creator and preserver are whispers in the otherwise total silence of the text around the role of the human, notwithstanding considerations of the “subject” so as to dismiss it.

Thus the happening of truth in the work of art, the event [*Ereignis*] that can potentially open out of a human creation if it sufficiently instigates the strife between earth and world, is the ground upon which matters come to a head. Is it Being that sends itself to the creator to let the work come to shine in its temporary fixity (that is strangely and somehow the height of actuality)? Is

¹⁹ *Beiträge zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis*. Gesamtausgabe vol. 65, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1989). Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu as *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012).

²⁰ In no way exempt from the same reworking, editing, and overwriting by Heidegger as is the case regarding the Nietzsche lectures. A closer study of all three versions of *Origin* may yet reveal an even more profound alignment of Heidegger’s one time affiliation with (the thought of) Nietzsche.

²¹ Indeed, it is especially so when we consider that earlier manuscript versions of *WMK* suggest that Heidegger positions himself much *closer* to Nietzsche than the published lecture course (Neske 1961) suggests.

the human being again the medium for the disclosure of Being in beings? Is that humanization of beings about which Heidegger is suspicious in §13 of the 1937 lecture course *Eternal Recurrence of the Same*²² a potential danger whenever we enter, with Nietzsche, into the question of art as manifesting a profound relation to truth? Perhaps this is what it means to be at the end of metaphysics: always on the precipice of falling back into a dangerous (and dangerously captivating) modernity, while attempting to negotiate its overcoming.

Alas, Heidegger never tells us decisively one way or the other. He does, however, in his final considerations in the Addendum to *Origin*, enumerate two important hints that have in each case to do with an *essential ambiguity*.²³ The first addresses the ambiguity around subjects and objects, one well explored by the first section of *Origin*, “Thing and Work,” as it attempts to distinguish work, thing, and equipment. As with many of Heidegger’s analyses of occupants of strange intermediate positions (for this is what in *Origin* he claims for equipment, and I can think of many intriguing examples from elsewhere in his corpus), subject and object become unsuitable to the task of explanation. But, as my questions suggest, this runs afoul of the chicken and the egg: is it the work that occasions its creator or the creator who makes the work? Is it, perhaps, ambiguously both? Again, Heidegger does not tell us. But what he does do is proceed to the second hint, of no little import if it is to be Nietzsche who is ultimately “responsible” for the humanization of beings even as he wished for precisely the opposite. Heidegger reflects,

“...the art-work and the art-ist rest ‘simultaneously’ in what goes on in art. In the rubric, ‘the setting-into-work of truth,’ in which it remains undecided but *decidable* who does the setting or in what way it occurs, there is concealed the *relation of Being and human being*, a relation that is unsuitably conceived even in this version—a distressing difficulty, which has been clear to me since *Being and Time*...” (100/211).

²² In this pivotal section of the lecture course, Heidegger explores the humanization of beings as the unintended consequence *par excellence* of Nietzsche’s effort to dehumanize the world. Cf. also the opening sections of *EWG* in which, in a discussion that rejects popular Nietzsche scholarship, Heidegger inserts the prefiguration of his *own* central claim, viz. that eternal recurrence as a thought is ultimately *the thought of world*, i.e., the thought that has the power to draw a horizon or “ring” around beings as a whole, thus recoiling on the inclusion of the human being as one among beings as a whole. Such inclusion *itself* recoils on *all* metaphysical questions with the problem of anthropomorphism (and centrism). *EWG* §§13 and 25 most incisively develop this central claim. Cf. also Chapter Five of Elkayam, “Thinking at the Limit of the Human: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (Ph.D. diss., Villanova University, 2016).

²³ Cf. the close of Section II. And note twelve of this essay, in which I cite Heidegger’s claim in *WME* that Nietzsche is necessarily an ambiguous figure. The italicization of *essential ambiguity* at this stage of the argument is meant to underscore Nietzsche’s ambiguous status and to anticipate an optic through which to characterize Heidegger’s ambivalence around Nietzsche. If read through the lens of his *own* conception of essential ambiguity as the tense unity of essential and divergent paths or trajectories, the re-emergence of the theme of ambiguity in *Origin* and its Addendum is doubly significant.

Clearly the belonging of the human being to the happening of Being is the animating question and quandary, i.e. what this has to do with time, with truth, with the waxing of history and the destiny of those who are called to think it. In its unique way, caught between extremes as one must be in thinking to and at the end of metaphysics (with Nietzsche), *Origin* bears the mark of *its* thinker, who, twenty years later can only conclude, “For the author himself...there remains the quandary of always having to speak in the language most opportune for each of the various stations on his way” (101/212).