

Addenda to Art: Nietzsche and the Concealed Relation of Being and Human Being

I. Introduction

I'd like to begin by thanking Khafiz and Yuliya not only for organizing today's event, which I am certain will prove to be most engaging, but also for their generous invitation to participate, and thus to return to *The Origin of the Work of Art* in light of my own work on Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. I should say as a prefatory remark that I am no expert on *Origin*, a fact which I announce in humble deference to those of you who are. Like many of its readers, I approached the "complete" text — i.e., the text as derived from the 1937 delivery of the tri-partite lecture at Frankfurt — for the first time, quite early in my philosophical career. I was captivated by the passionate language of the strife between earth and world, having only just been introduced to the Heraclitean notion of *polemos* and Empedocles' opposition between love and strife as the animating force of the cosmos and of cosmic change. The possibility of "instigation" — as Hofstadter renders *Anstiftung* and *Bestreitung* in the prevalent English translation (cf. 38/175) — that is, instigation of such passionate tension by the work of art, is itself alluring. In the instigation of the artwork, in other words, a possibility glimmers and seduces, inviting us into the space where art negotiates the happening of truth, the coming to radiant presence of a being in such a way that Being itself "appears."

Returning to the essay just as I drew my dissertation work to a close, however, I had a different experience. Perhaps it is merely a difference of age and training — some ten years separate my first reading from the most recent, occasioned by our gathering

here today. Perhaps when we take into consideration the fecundity and complexity of Heidegger's work a different apprehension from reading to reading is inevitable. No doubt *Being and Time* affords a similar experience to many if not all of us, viz. that each time we return to the text we alight upon something different, something new, even if only a nuance (though in my experience each time I seem to encounter an altogether new text). The extent to which *Being and Time* is an effort to think the subterranean force of the possible makes it a text so rich as to be inexhaustible. It thus requires a studied and patient hand to engage its telling silences.

Now, in light of the fact that I can rigorously speak neither to the knot of translation problems unique to *Origin*, nor to the various versions of the lecture and the differences between this or that composition thereof, nor finally, in any *decisive* way to what I would hazard is the analogue to the possible in *Origin* that gives the text *its* unique inexhaustibility, I shall restrict myself to the highly speculative hypothesis that *die Erde* stands in here for a certain figure of the possible — i.e., the darkness, the withdrawal, on the basis of which the apparent comes to shine, and to stand (out in the open).

Yet given that the self-seclusion of this “earth” that curiously appears here and subsequently disappears from the explicit landscape of Heidegger's thought, turns all efforts to penetrate it into the destruction of an impotent will, earth will *not* be the proper subject of my remarks. I shall say only briefly and in the hopes of opening rather than answering questions that, in light of *Nietzsche* — about whom we know Heidegger is thinking a great deal in this period — one wonders: is the earth, with its downward pull compelled to enfold all that by contrast erects itself into its enveloping

and gestational darkness, in any way akin to that abyss that Nietzsche likewise thinks in contrast to the mountain heights, viz. the sea? If we were free to follow this directive, what might we take away from the juxtaposition of earth and sea as figures of abyssal depth? What does Heidegger's choice of earth, in other words, say about the correlative discussions in the 1930's of roots and rootedness, a *Gesicht* of depth that cannot, for better or worse, apply to the unfathomable fathoms of the fluid sea?

This brief series of questions of course only begs further questions. If there is some kinship between Heidegger's abyssal figure and Nietzsche's, that is to say, if the relative concurrence of the lecture course *The Will to Power as Art* and *Origin* is enough to suggest that Nietzsche is on Heidegger's mind when he poses the question of art in terms of the event, happening, or becoming of truth, then Heidegger's own Nietzsche interpretation should shed some light on the axial mysteries of *Origin*.

But a problem immediately presents itself: Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation is no simple matter about which one may say once and for all, Heidegger thought or felt thus and thus about Nietzsche, period. The most precise and mercifully concise way to speak of Heidegger's interpretation is to name it as ambivalent, i.e., as at once pulling in two directions, the tense unity of divergent paths, the twists and turns of which only temporarily decide the priority of one alternative over the other. Strangely, and if this were Heidegger talking I think he'd say *merkwürdigerweise*, this ambivalence with respect to Nietzsche itself describes an intimate strife, i.e., a unifying holding in tension that holds together as it holds apart. Perhaps even the effort to think the Nietzsche interpretation – again, concurrent as we know the early years of that interpretation were with the genesis of *Origin* – has us already moving in a common

domain. If this were the case, any effort to simply enumerate aspects of *Origin* as they pertain to the Nietzsche interpretation would require the advance delineation of this shared domain, which is far too much work for the space and time provided us here. What I propose to do, by contrast or better by compromise, is to speak to this issue of Heidegger's ambivalence with respect to Nietzsche and to continue to allow a few highly speculative hypotheses concerning *Origin* to naturally unfold.

II. Considerations of Ambivalence

As to the concrete details of this ambivalence, consider for example, that on the closing pages of his 1929/30 lecture course *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger names Nietzsche the last of the greats to bear witness to *enthousiasmos* (that terrifying rapture in which we are carried away to the possible as a profound experience of world, cf. the epigraph to your handout);¹ but in 1940, in the lecture course *European Nihilism* he argues that Nietzsche's intensification of the legacy of modernity installs human dominion *over* the world (or beings as a whole) by making the subject the sole legislator of truth and falsity. If it seems chronology would decide the matter one way or the other and thus vanquish the tension of ambivalence, i.e., if it seems as though Heidegger once held a higher opinion of Nietzsche and later revoked it, I would direct the reader to Heidegger's praise of Nietzsche in the 1952 lecture course delivered once he was reinstated to teaching after the ban, viz. *What is Called Thinking?*

¹ Note here the qualification of Van Gogh's painting in *Origin*, section I., (Thing and Work): "The painting spoke. In the nearness of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than where we usually tend to be" (24/161).

Suffice it to say, where Nietzsche and Heidegger are concerned, matters are never simple. To capture the dynamic of Heidegger's ambivalence as concisely as possible, especially as it holds true of the period we are here gathered to consider, one might say that the tension lies between Nietzsche as that inspirational thinker whose eternal recurrence breathed life into the ekstastic temporality of *Being and Time* on the one hand, and Nietzsche as the thinker who consummates the decision for the predominance of beings over Being, on the other. This latter, i.e., the decision for the predominance of beings over Being is what Heidegger will in 1939 define as metaphysics proper; thus Nietzsche is branded the consummate metaphysician.

Indeed there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that Heidegger's official *Auseinandersetzung* (or confrontation) with Nietzsche (whose commencement we could roughly date to 1936) is likewise or, perhaps better, *rather*, an *Auseinandersetzung* with the Western metaphysical tradition and its interpretation of Being as presence at hand long prepared by the *Destruktion* of Heidegger's early thought. If this is the case, then Nietzsche's role in this confrontation is to be the *final figure* with whom Heidegger must contend in the effort to overcome metaphysics, i.e., to turn back into the commencement of thinking in the West to a more originary beginning, to a thinking that can riddle *deeper* than what metaphysics assumes from out of the prejudicial experience of the everyday.

Interestingly, this contention occurs most decisively on the grounds of truth, even in spite of Nietzsche's raising of art to the status of higher value in its transfiguring capability and fidelity to Becoming and change. In *The Will to Power as Knowledge*, the third in the series of lecture courses on Nietzsche delivered in 1939,

Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's conception of truth is *holding-to-be-true*, a long hand for *belief*, that is radical insofar as it matters not whether a statement, for example, is true, so long as *some* statement is believed to be — that is, *held* to be — true. The hold, the literal *Halt*, is meant to signal a temporal qualification, viz. bringing to a halt, stopping, setting to rest, petrifying, fixating, and so on. Thus when Heidegger claims in §19 that truth as holding-to-be-true is in essence “the perspectival and horizontal intention and anticipation of identity and selfsameness as the ground of permanence,” we are meant to hear the temporal dimension of Nietzsche's thinking opening up and wedding the truth operation to the very ground of what it means to be identical, self-same, or permanent (i.e., classically speaking, what it means to be *in Being*) [616/123].

The German for anticipation, *Voraussehen*, gives the literal sense of seeing in advance; thus taken, the sentence would amount to saying that truth as holding-to-be-true is in essence the perspectival and horizontal intention to see identity and self-sameness as the ground of permanence in advance. When rendered in this fashion, the relation of the truth function to the schematizing of chaos — the advance sending out of categorial forms that order and condition the possibility of experience — and thus to Kant and the legacy of modernity, becomes abundantly clear. In other words, Nietzsche's conception of truth as holding-to-be-true, radical though it may be, still operates temporally speaking within the parameters of the tradition: it stabilizes what is in flux — whether sensory data, drives, or a whole human body — to a graspable presence that can be witnessed over time to be self-same, identical, i.e. *to be*.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche, for all his participation in the tradition by way of a conception of truth that relies on the stabilization of presence, flies in the face of it, for

the primordially and *a priori* quality of truth's operation does *not* secure for truth the status of highest value. Heidegger reminds us rather that for Nietzsche truth is a *necessary* value, but *not* the highest among them. The status of highest value is, after all, reserved for art. Thus where Nietzsche is concerned, consideration of truth will inevitably lead to art. Given the relation between truth and art in *Origin*, this is of no little consequence for our current considerations.

I shall return to the mutual implication of art and truth as concerns Nietzsche, but for the moment let us proceed with Heidegger's 1939 analysis. The demotion in rank that truth undergoes in Nietzsche's thought may seem alienating [*befremden*] in light of the "traditional metaphysical dominance [*Vorherrschaft*] of the true, as what is in itself eternally in being and valid," yet while this may *seem* alienating, Heidegger will demonstrate to us precisely why the truth of the situation is, in fact, otherwise: in Nietzsche's metaphysical 'projection' [*Entwurf*] truth is proper to life insofar as it makes constant (616/123). For, **[and this is the first quotation on your handout]**

"Human life itself, belonging to chaos, truly pertains to chaos as an overwhelming Becoming, in the manner of art [*in der Weise der Kunst*]. What truth cannot do, *art* accomplishes: the transfiguration [*Verklärung*] of what is alive to higher possibilities, hence the actualization [*Verwirklichung*] and activity of life in the midst of the truly actual [*eigentlichen Wirklichen*] chaos" (616/123).

Now if human life intrinsically belongs to chaos, and is subject (as Heidegger at several intervals will argue) to the penetrating forces of chaos and its overwhelming urges simply by virtue of embodiment, then its pertinence to chaos takes the form of art rather than of truth. Art in its function of transfiguration can accomplish something that truth in its stabilization cannot; it can be *faithful* to the conditions of Becoming such as they are, and not by virtue of something like a laudatory mimetics. Art is faithful to Becoming by undertaking its work, i.e. by transfiguring life and transporting

it over to higher possibilities. Tempted though we might be to stop here and fixate on the common language of actuality and the power of art (and perhaps the work of art?) to transfigure the living to higher possibilities, we should nevertheless continue to press the relation between truth and art, as it will yield an important insight that may bear back upon these intriguing problems of “actuality” and “transfiguring power”.

In an earlier lecture course, *The Will to Power as Art* (1936), Heidegger argues that it is precisely because of the opposition between the functions of truth and art that between them – for Nietzsche contra Plato – a discordance rages and rapture [*Rausch*] attunes all aesthetics. Whereas the discordance between truth and art for Plato is felicitous, i.e. is contentedly covered over by the impetus the sensuous offers to ascend to the truth of Being (the supra-sensuous), Nietzsche’s inverse Platonism kills off the supra-sensuous God and art is required to transfigure reality while truth becomes the illusion/lie.

Here in *The Will to Power as Knowledge*, however, Heidegger has made alterations to this agenda. Art does indeed maintain the function of transfiguring life and delivering it over to higher possibilities so it keeps its elevated status. But it can do so only on the basis of a deeper and hidden value, that of harmony (*homoiōsis*, *Einstimmigkeit*) with the truly “actual,” chaos. Discovery of this hidden value exacts a consequence: Nietzsche’s art is transformed into a species of knowledge (to be thought in terms of its profound relation to truth), whose task is to schematize chaos in accordance with *the* practical need, viz. that (human) life flourish across time, that it achieve permanence.

So, to pose the question in a Heideggerian way, how then do matters stand with Nietzsche once *homoiōsis* enters onto the scene? To make a long story short, this harmony [*Einstimmigkeit*] turns out to be the oldest truth-trick in the book, going all the way back to the Greeks of course, and achieving fruition in Nietzsche's thinking. By 1939 the reliance of art's transfiguration on constancy, and of its status as highest value on harmony, transforms the discordance that raged in 1936 into a quiet pitter-patter, and Nietzsche—seen from the vantage point of the development of truth as harmony—is on the one hand, something of a counterfeit Kantian with a taste for chaos, but on the other, a *thinker* of significant ambiguity. For the question remains: how can Nietzsche both secure a conception of truth as fixity and stability *and* insist on harmony with chaos, with all that Becomes? Is this not contradictory? No, because it is exactly what Heidegger would—and does—call ambiguous. In fact, [and this is the second quotation on your handout] “Nietzsche transformed himself into an ambiguous figure [*zweideutigen Gestalt*], and, within his world and that of the present time, he had to do this. What we must do is grasp the forward thrust and the uniqueness, what is decisive and ultimate, behind this ambiguity” (474/4).

III. Art, Truth, and the Destiny of the Thinker

In the Addendum to *Origin* that appears in the English translation by Hofstadter in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, and which was included in the edited volume *Basic Writings*, Heidegger pens several retrospective reflections on *Origin*. While acknowledging that I will be unable here to speak to the myriad possibilities opened by the view afforded from 1956, it is nevertheless productive to invoke two moments: one,

a claim that Heidegger makes concerning what reflection on art may be, and two, the delineation of two important hints. I propose to turn now toward the first – that reflection on what art may be – and leave the second, the delineation of two important hints – open to be explored at the conclusion of this talk.

Writ large, the Addendum to *Origin* is concerned with a certain tension between the language of fixing, setting, and standing and that of *letting* happen, *letting be*. Heidegger therefore makes it his task to specify the intended meaning of any major terms deployed in *Origin* that would appear to hearken to his own later designation of the essence of modern technology. *Ge-stell*, the “en-framing as which the work occurs when it sets itself up and sets itself forth,” is one such term that Heidegger later finds troubling, and for good reason (52/189). In the Addendum Heidegger claims that the meaning of *Ge-stell* in *Origin* is a letting-come-forth-here-into the rift-design as bounding outline or *peras*. Essentially, he claims that his use of *Ge-stell* here is faithfully related to the Greek sense of *morphē* as *Gestalt*. Thus, without fully deconstructing that difficult hyphenated phrase that is meant to capture the meaning of *Ge-stell* as Heidegger claims he intended it in *Origin*, we might say that he was bold enough there to attempt to think what it means to create, even as a letting, a work – to create, even as a letting, a being – whose radiance could polarize the meaning-nexus of the human being and the total withdrawal thereof to such an extent that this rift, this profound difference that brings the opponents it distinguishes into intimacy, could itself appear. Indeed, this is ambitious stuff. Thus the resonance of the German that is lost in English, viz. the repetition we hear in *Ge-stell*, *aufstellt* (setting up), and *herstellt* (setting forth), unites the work so en-framed with the setting up of world and

the setting forth of earth that are the “two essential features of the work-being of the work” (36/173).

The question thus becomes: is this uniting of world, earth, and work in the creative act of bringing forth the work, even in its “passivity” (which Heidegger argues is the highest expression of doing and acting, we recall) still an act of all-too human violence? Clearly, if Heidegger’s own retrospective reflections can be trusted, he fears they may be. For he goes to great pains – and this I think not simply because he was concerned his meaning would be mistaken, but rather because he senses a danger – he goes to great pains to specify that the *stellen* so operative in *Origin* be understood in terms of the *originary*, i.e., not derivative, sense of the Greek constellation: *logos-poiēsis-thesis*. The derivative interpretation of the meaning of this constellation, the one that is taken up as the very tradition of metaphysics from out of a failure on the part of the Greeks to pose the founding question at the moment of the founding experience (of *alētheia*), is then transformed by modernity into another form of *stellen* not so faithful to the originary Greek, viz. *vor-stellen*, “representation,” which sets itself up by commandeering, Heidegger reminds us, by “taking control of the absolute,” and which devotes itself to “fixing and securing in place” in the manner of which we *should* be most wary (209). Heidegger summarizes, and I include his statement at length

[number three on the handout] because it is of great import to our considerations here:

“When we hear the words ‘fix in place’ [*fest-stellen* in one form or another] and ‘enframing’ [*Gestell*] in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, we must, on the one hand, put out of mind the modern meaning of placing or enframing, and yet at the same time, we must not fail to note that, and in what way, the Being that defines the modern period – Being as enframing – stems from the Western destiny of Being and has not been thought *up* by the philosophers but rather thought *to* thinkers” (209-10).

Earlier in my remarks, I noted as one direction in which Heidegger's ambivalence as regards Nietzsche pulls him that Nietzsche is designated as the consummate metaphysician whose realization, i.e. fulfillment, of the trajectory of metaphysics marks him as the last, at the end. It is Nietzsche who, on Heidegger's more critical view, takes up the legacy afforded him historically by modernity and brings it to its utmost expression in the will-to-willing that makes the human being the sole legislator of truth and falsity. [Read...very...slowly] In other words, it is Nietzsche who is "responsible," even if only as the recipient of a historically destined thought *to* the thinker, for the installation of the modern technological interpretation of the meaning of Being based on a hidden fidelity to *homoïōsis* that makes his transfiguring "art" as elevated over fixating "truth" while *apparently* radical, simply a reversal of that founding (i.e. Greek) interpretive mistake.

Interestingly, here, Heidegger's concern is that in some way his *own* thinking may be affiliated with this "modern" trajectory, so he is careful (and clever!) to explicitly distantiate himself from the "modern" interpretation of *Gestell* and its affiliates. The thought *to* which Heidegger was destined, evidently, is other than modern, and in one sense, even other than Greek. The spur to my larger project, I'd like to share with you, came from an effort to investigate the way in which Heidegger allocates Nietzsche to a specific place at the end of metaphysics, and yet once (although not simply one time) *himself* subscribed to the very thinking that was, *through* Nietzsche, to be overcome.

To be sure, Heidegger's own intimate affiliation with the thought of Nietzsche resists witness. He is less than explicit in owning his inspiration by Nietzsche, for

example, in terms of temporal horizons and human freedom for death in *Being and Time*. But when one is tenacious enough to, in Heidegger's terms, "wrest" these affiliations from concealment, one can come to understand that Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche is at the same time (yet not reducible to) a confrontation with what Heidegger diagnoses to be the limits of his own early thinking. So, to bring together several strands of speculation in one complex knot, when Heidegger in 1956 casts a retrospective glance at *Origin* and the dangers that may have prevailed there even only temporarily, we must wonder whether Heidegger senses in *Origin* an affiliation with Nietzsche (as he reads, and perhaps to a certain extent *mis*-reads him) from which he must now distantiate himself.

IV. Concluding Thoughts

It is of course impossible for us to decide this in the space afforded here. I can only say that having returned to *Origin* in the light of my own work I am now compelled to follow it through and hope to pursue these possibilities further. But for our purposes here, it is perhaps helpful to remark that there are indeed several aspects of *Origin* that have a Nietzschean ring – or, to put it in the words of Otto Pöggeler who remarked of the *Beiträge* (roughly concurrent, yet again with *Origin* and with the Nietzsche-confrontation), that one could sense the "Sils-Maria breeze and... *Ecce Homo* mood". And yet, there is also – and perhaps equally as much – evidence to suggest that the confrontation was already being prepared, if not yet underway in *Origin*. In much the same way as the 1936 lecture course *The Will to Power as Art* already on the one hand claims Nietzsche's inversion of the tradition (as inversion of Platonism), but on

the other nevertheless wonders at the rapture of aesthetics and the grand style of art that enables a robustly physiological interpretation of biology “on the basis of Being” to be attributed to Nietzsche, *Origin* is to my eye equally fraught. This is to say that and again, I’m being openly speculative here – that *Origin* itself may be caught between on the one hand, a rather ambitious opening of polarized heights and depths whose only “repose” is in so intense an agitation that it appears to be equilibrated in the work fashioned by human hands, and on the other, a prescription to advance *beyond* the modern conception of the human being as the one who violently decides upon the Being of beings. Hence the many allusions to the human being as creator and preserver are whispers in the otherwise total silence of the text around the role of the human, notwithstanding considerations of the “subject” so as to dismiss it.

Thus the happening of truth in the work of art, the event that can potentially open out of a human creation if it sufficiently instigates the strife between earth and world, is the ground upon which matters come to a head. Is it Being that sends itself to the creator such that the latter lets the work come to shine in its temporary fixity that is strangely and somehow the height of actuality? Is the human being again the medium for the disclosure of Being in beings? Is that humanization of beings about which Heidegger is suspicious in §13 of the 1937 lecture course *Eternal Recurrence of the Same* a potential danger whenever we enter, with Nietzsche, into the question of art as manifesting a profound relation to truth?

These are not questions that can be answered readily or easily. It is better to leave them open as provocations for discussion and further thinking. I will, as a gesture of closure, turn final to those final captivating pronouncements of the

Addendum to *Origin*. Moments after the distantiating from the dangerous language of modernity, Heidegger relates that talk about the self-establishing [*sich...richten*, or *sich...einrichten*] of truth in/as the work, “touches upon the problem of the ontological difference” (210). He then refers us explicitly to a “note of caution” he offered in *Origin*, viz. that in his discussion of the “self-establishing openness of the open region” what sphere was touched upon there could not yet be explicated (cf. 49/186).

Heidegger’s retrospective remark upon this note of caution is telling [see number four on your handout]:

“The whole essay *The Origin of the Work of Art* deliberately yet tacitly moves on the path of the question of the essence of Being. Reflection on what *art* may be is completely and decidedly determined only in regard to the question of *Being*. Art is considered neither an area of cultural achievement nor an appearance of spirit; it belongs to the *propriative event* [*Ereignis*] by way of which the meaning of Being (see *Being and Time*) can alone be defined. What art may be is one of the questions to which no answers are given in the essay. Whatever gives the impression of such an answer are directives for questioning” (210-211).

Studied readers of Heidegger are of course accustomed to being told, from whatever vantage point, that the question of the meaning of Being opened in *Being and Time* is the source and resource for every one of Heidegger’s inquiries. In this sense, the retrospective remark appears banal. However, when we think it in light of the possibility that Nietzsche’s conception of art is being engaged here, art that is ambiguously *both* art and truth, then thinking art is always already a thinking *toward* the truth of Being, as Nietzsche’s thought is already a transition *to* the other commencement from out of the founding rather than the guiding question. This is what it means to be at the end of metaphysics: always on the precipice of falling back into a dangerous (and dangerously captivating) modernity, while attempting to negotiate its overcoming.

And this is what fascinates me most: in Heidegger's final considerations in the Addendum to *Origin*, his enumeration of the two important hints have in each case to do with an *essential ambiguity*. The first hint is to do with the ambiguity around subjects and objects, an ambiguity in fact well explored by the first section of the text as it attempts to distinguish work, thing, and equipment. As with many of Heidegger's analyses of occupants of strange intermediate positions (for this is what in *Origin* he claims for equipment, and I can think of many intriguing examples from elsewhere in his corpus), subject and object become unsuitable to the task of explanation. By going to the texts that Heidegger asks us to juxtapose if we wish to highlight this first instance of ambiguity that hints, we can see that the two discussions appear at least to involve the problem of the chicken and the egg: is it the work that occasions its creator or the creator who makes the work? Is it, perhaps, ambiguously both? Heidegger does not tell us. But what he does do is proceed to the second hint, also an instance of ambiguity that is of no little import if it is to be Nietzsche who is ultimately "responsible" for the humanization of beings even as he wished for precisely the opposite. Heidegger reflects [and this is the final quotation on the handout],

“...the art-*work* and the art-*ist* rest ‘simultaneously’ in what goes on in art. In the rubric, ‘the setting-into-work of truth,’ in which it remains undecided but *decidable* who does the setting or in what way it occurs, there is concealed *the relation of Being and human being*, a relation that is unsuitably conceived even in this version – a distressing difficulty, which has been clear to me since *Being and Time...*” (211).

Clearly the belonging of the human being to the happening of Being itself is the animating question and quandary, i.e. what this has to do with time, with truth, with the waxing of history and the destiny of those who are called to think it. In its unique way, and caught between extremes as one must be in thinking to and at the end of metaphysics (with Nietzsche), *Origin* bears the mark of *its* thinker, who, twenty years

later can only conclude, “For the author himself...there remains the quandary of always having to speak in the language most opportune for each of the various stations on his way” (212).